RATIONAL DISINHIBITION AND EXTERNALITIES IN PREVENTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Toxvaerd, Flavio
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12402
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1737-1755
• 关键词: antiretroviral therapy; infectious-disease; hiv; PROTECTION; IMPACT; RISK

摘要

This article studies a model of disease propagation in which rational and forward-looking individuals can control their exposure to infection by engaging in costly preventive behavior. Equilibrium outcomes under decentralized decision making are characterized and contrasted to the outcomes chosen by a social planner. In general, individuals overexpose themselves to infection, leading to suboptimally high disease prevalence. The model is applied to study the welfare effects of preexposure prophylaxis, which reduces transmission between serodiscordant couples and causes disinhibition. It is shown that a decrease in the induced infection risks increases disease prevalence and can lead to decreases in overall welfare.