AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF COOPERATION IN THE DYNAMIC COMMON POOL GAME

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vespa, Emanuel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12428
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 417-440
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; perfect equilibrium; strategies

摘要

This article studies experimentally to what extent subjects can cooperate in a dynamic common pool game, where the stage game changes endogenously. Although efficiency can be supported with strategies that condition on history, the main finding is that it is difficult to cooperate. Even if the incentives to cooperate are large, modal behavior can be rationalized with equilibrium Markov strategies that do not condition on history. The popularity of Markov strategies, however, is decreasing in the incentives to cooperate. The evidence also suggests that strategic uncertainty added by facing stage games that change in time may move play away from efficiency.