SOCIAL INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cubas, German; Silos, Pedro
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12422
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 219-240
• 关键词: redistributive taxation; job mobility

摘要

This article studies how insurance from progressive taxation improves the matching of workers to occupations. We propose an equilibrium dynamic assignment model to illustrate how social insurance encourages mobility. Workers experiment to find their best occupational fit in a process filled with uncertainty. Risk aversion and limited earnings insurance induce workers to remain in unfitting occupations. We estimate the model using microdata from the United States and Germany. Higher earnings uncertainty explains the U.S. higher mobility rate. When workers in the United States enjoy Germany's higher progressivity, mobility rises. Output and welfare gains are large.