The limits of meritocracy: Screening bureaucrats under imperfect verifiability
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez; Wang, Xiao Yu; Zhang, Shuang
署名单位：
Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3878
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.06.003
发表日期：
2019
页码：
223-241
关键词：
摘要：
Does bureaucratic ability predict promotion in governments? We show that self-reported performance in enforcing the One Child Policy predicts mayoral promotion in China. However, misreporting handicaps screening-a non-manipulated performance measure does not predict promotion. We show that this is consistent with a model where a government has a meritocratic objective but underestimates the imperfect verifiability of performance, rather than a model where a government is only interested in the illusion of meritocracy. Thus, despite meritocratic intentions, we challenge the notion that a successful promotion system effectively substituted for democratic institutions in explaining Chinese growth.
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