MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald
• 署名单位: Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12592
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 155-185
• 关键词: offer auctions; search; equilibrium; COMPETITION; ECONOMY; sellers; LABOR

摘要

This article shows how meeting frictions affect equilibrium trading mechanisms and allocations in an environment where identical sellers post mechanisms to compete for buyers with ex ante heterogeneous private valuations. Multiple submarkets can emerge, each consisting of all sellers posting a particular mechanism and the buyers who visit those sellers. Under mild conditions, high-valuation buyers are all located in the same submarket, and low valuation buyers can be in: (i) the same submarket, (ii) a different submarket, and (iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii). The decentralized equilibrium is efficient when sellers can post auctions with reserve prices or entry fees.