IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Eungik; Choi, Andrew; Choi, Syngjoo; Gueron, Yves
• 署名单位: New York University; University of Chicago; Seoul National University (SNU)
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12606
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 387-412
• 关键词: public-goods; environmental preservation; voluntary contribution; monotone games; COOPERATION; equilibrium; preferences; uncertainty; gradualism

摘要

This article provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of a repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial-period contribution gap between two players long-lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and persistently reduces group contribution. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperators provides a coherent account of the treatment effects.