GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Frances Xu; Suen, Wing
• 署名单位: Loyola University Chicago; University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12591
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 413-443
• 关键词: AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION; CONTRACTS

摘要

A university uses both early-stage selection outcome (high-school affiliation) and late-stage admission test outcome (standardized test scores) to select students. We use this model to study policies that have been proposed to combat inefficient gaming in college admissions. Increasing university enrollment size can exacerbate gaming and worsen the selection outcome. Abolishing standardized tests for university admissions increases gaming targeting high-school admissions and worsens the selection outcome, whereas eliminating high-school ability sorting may improve the university selection outcome under some cost conditions of gaming. Committing to a lower-powered selection scheme can improve the selection outcome by reducing gaming behaviors.