SETTLING LAWSUITS WITH PIRATES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hua, Xinyu; Spier, Kathryn E.
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12608
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 543-575
• 关键词: copyright enforcement; patent litigation; music industry; PIRACY; MODEL; appropriability; PROTECTION; settlement; CONTRACTS; ECONOMICS

摘要

A firm licenses a product to overlapping generations of heterogeneous consumers. Consumers may purchase the product, pirate/steal it, or forego it. Higher consumer types enjoy higher gross benefits and are caught stealing at a higher rate. The firm may commit to an out-of-court settlement policy that is soft on pirates, so high types purchase the product and low types steal it until caught. Settlement contracts, which include both cash payments and licenses for future product use, facilitate price discrimination. Settlement may either create social value by expanding the market or destroy value by limiting market access and possibly deterring more efficient entrants.