ADVERSE SELECTION, LEARNING, AND COMPETITIVE SEARCH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mayr-Dorn, Karin
• 署名单位: Johannes Kepler University Linz
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12593
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 129-153
• 关键词: unemployment; equilibrium; INFORMATION; MARKETS

摘要

I develop a model that allows for an analysis of the effects of time on adverse selection in the presence of search frictions. I find that, as a firm takes longer to adjust a worker's contract in response to learning about his type, inefficient overwork during the time before wage adjustment (probation) decreases. This provides a rationale for an optimal (minimum) probation period of about one month in the baseline scenario. Optimal probation duration varies with the degree of search frictions, the cost of effort, the relative productivity of different types of workers, and minimum wage regulations.