REGULATORY PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mei, Yuan
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12676
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 817-850
• 关键词: national treatment; TRADE; Tariff; AGREEMENTS; gravity; IMPACT; wars

摘要

I develop a general equilibrium framework to analyze the welfare consequences of product regulations and their international harmonization. In my model, raising product standards reduces a negative consumption externality, but also increases the marginal and fixed costs of production. When product standards are set noncooperatively, the effects of standards on other countries' wages and number of firms are not internalized, giving rise to an international inefficiency. The World Trade Organization's nondiscrimination principle of national treatment only partly addresses this inefficiency. Welfare losses from abandoning national treatment average 2.8%, whereas the maximum welfare gains from efficient cooperation average 11.8%.