AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REFERRALS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lang, Youze; Yang, Youzhi
• 署名单位: Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12671
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 655-692
• 关键词: Social networks; match quality; job search; wage; EMPLOYMENT; contacts

摘要

About 40% of workers find their jobs through referrals. We distinguish between two types of referrals based on whether the referrer works at the hiring firm (internal referrals) or not (external referrals). Interestingly, jobs found through internal (external) referrals pay more (less) than those found through formal methods. An equilibrium labor market model is then built by introducing an incentive-compatible mechanism through which workers can share job opening information. A nondegenerate wage distribution arises in equilibrium with a wage premium (penalty) for internal (external) referrals. When calibrated, our model can capture these salient features of the U.S. labor market.