Last corrupt deed before retirement? Evidence from a lower middle-income country

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cuong Viet Nguyen
• 署名单位: Vietnam National University Hanoi (VNU Hanoi) System
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102673
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: TERM LIMITS; retirement; CORRUPTION; State-owned enterprise; privatization

摘要

We provide evidence of the effect of term limits on the rent-seeking behavior of directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam by showing that these directors recruit substantially more employees just before retirement. We argue that a possible motive of these directors for the over-recruitment is to obtain bribes from employees, since the increase in employment is not associated with higher output, and the effect of these directors' last year in office on SOE labor is smaller in provinces with better corruption control. This finding also provides an explanation why SOEs tend to have an excess of labor and suggests that privatization can reduce this excess.