INFORMATION DESIGN IN ALLOCATION WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yi-Chun; Hu, Gaoji; Yang, Xiangqian
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Hunan University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12754
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1267-1285
• 关键词: mechanisms

摘要

We study information design in a single-agent allocation problem with costly verification, where the principal has a positive reservation value. The agent learns privately a signal about the principal's allocation value, drawn from a distribution controlled by an information designer. Given the signal distribution, the principal designs a mechanism to maximize her net value. We show that the agent-optimal information pools high values at a signal just worth verification, whereas the principal-optimal information features full disclosure. Moreover, any agent-optimal information is principal-worst, despite their partially aligned interests and the absence of transfers.