OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTION AND EDUCATION SIGNALING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bastani, Spencer; Blumkin, Tomer; Micheletto, Luca
• 署名单位: Uppsala University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Milan
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12756
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1239-1265
• 关键词: Optimal income taxation; adverse selection; policies

摘要

We develop a theory of optimal income and education taxation under asymmetric information between firms and workers. Our results show that a max-min optimal tax code can achieve predistribution by pooling wages across ability levels, conditional on income. We identify conditions under which the optimal solution leads to pooling or separating equilibria, highlighting bidirectional incentive constraints. Implementation requires nonlinear income taxes coupled with education subsidies or mandates. Predistribution is only feasible when income taxes are complemented by policies that restrict signaling opportunities. Our framework provides new insights into reducing wage inequality through optimal tax policy and labor market information management.