TAXATION OF TOP INCOMES AND TAX AVOIDANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Nola, Alessandro; Kocharkov, Georgi; Scholl, Almuth; Tkhir, Anna-Mariia; Wang, Haomin
• 署名单位: University of Birmingham; University of Konstanz; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Allianz SE; Cardiff University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12758
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 983-1018
• 关键词: Entrepreneurship; progressivity; frictions

摘要

We examine the aggregate and distributional effects of raising the top marginal income tax rate in the presence of entrepreneurial tax avoidance. In a model with heterogeneous agents and occupational choice, entrepreneurs can avoid taxes by choosing the legal form of business organization and shifting income across tax bases. Applied to the U.S. economy, we find that tax avoidance weakens the distortionary effects of higher income taxes at the top but makes them ineffective at lowering inequality. Eliminating tax avoidance by an equal tax treatment of entrepreneurs across all legal forms substantially increases tax revenue, aggregate output, and welfare.