Designing unemployment insurance for developing countries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cirelli, Fernando; Espino, Emilio; Sanchez, Juan M.
• 署名单位: New York University; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102565
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Unemployment insurance; informality; moral hazard; Saving accounts; UISA; Mexico; incomplete markets; job search

摘要

The high incidence of informality in the labor markets of middle-income economies challenges the provision of unemployment protection. We show that, despite informational frictions, the introduction of an unemployment insurance savings account (UISA) system may provide substantial benefits. This system improves welfare by providing insurance to the unemployed and creating incentives to work in the formal sector. The optimal scheme generates a reduction in unemployment (from 4 to 3 percent), an increase in formality (from 68 to 72 percent) and a rise in total output (by 4 percent). Overall, individuals obtain welfare gains equivalent to a 2.4 percent increase in consumption in every period.