Better together? Group incentives and the demand for prevention☆
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lagarde, Mylene; Herl, Carlos Riumallo
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3878
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103365
发表日期：
2025
关键词：
摘要：
In a field experiment with 400 groups of informal entrepreneurs in El Salvador, we compare the impact of group incentives (linked to compliance of all members) to equivalent individual ones to encourage cardiovascular check-ups. We test two incentive designs: small rewards and lotteries. Group incentives are as effective as individual ones at increasing demand for prevention, but, unlike individual incentives, they fail to target those with potentially higher health risks. The equal effectiveness of group incentives is linked to more communication, coordination between members and, to some extent, peer pressure. These social dynamics contribute to reduce uncertainty about other group members' decisions and enhance the perceived net benefit of prevention. Although the preventive check-ups do not induce short-term lifestyle changes, they substantially increase the detection of new risk factors, making all incentives highly cost-effective interventions in this population.