Loose knots: Strong versus weak commitments to save for education in Uganda

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karlan, Dean; Linden, Leigh L.
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103444
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Commitment savings; Micro-savings; Educational resources; School participation

摘要

Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error = 0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.