Meritocracy in a bureaucracy☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aman-Rana, Shan
• 署名单位: University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103428
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Promotions; DISCRETION; DELEGATION; rules; Weberian Bureaucracy; Meritocracy; networks; Civil service; PAS; punjab; pakistan

摘要

This paper examines the Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS), a bureaucracy in a high-corruption, lowtransparency environment, to assess whether discretion in promotion decisions allows for the use of private information on bureaucrats' abilities. Using unique data on junior bureaucrats' abilities and their social ties with senior officials, the study finds evidence of meritocratic promotions: senior officials are more likely to promote high-ability juniors over those with social ties, despite limited explicit incentives. I also provide evidence indicating the circumstances under which meritocratic promotions are more likely to take place. These findings suggest that discretion can lead to improved outcomes, even in settings marked by pervasive corruption.