Did Glass-Steagall increase the cost of external finance for corporate investment?:: Evidence from bank and insurance company affiliations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: George Mason University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700022877
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 372-396
• 关键词: liquidity; CHOICE; debt; ACT

摘要

The Glass-Steagall Act may have increased the cost for corporations of raising external funds for investment spending. Significant differences are found in the way financial institutions influenced corporate investment spending. Investment regressions for a sample of companies affiliated to financial institutions are estimated and compared to those for a control sample. Prior to Glass-Steagall, affiliated companies do not display any sensitivity between investment spending and internal measures of liquidity, whereas the control sample does. After Glass-Steagall, bank and trust-affiliated companies display the same large sensitivity of investment spending to internal measures of liquidity as the control sample does.