Enforcing property rights through reputation: Mexico's early industrialization, 1878-1913
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0507
DOI：
10.1017/S0022050701042048
发表日期：
2001
页码：
950-973
关键词：
摘要：
Mexico's initial industrialization was based on firms that were grouped: that is, linked to other firms through close affiliations with a common bank. Most explanations for the prevalence of groups are based on increasing returns or missing formal capital markets. We propose a simpler explanation that better fits the facts of Mexican history. In the absence of secure property rights, tangible collateral could not credibly be offered to creditors; but there remained the possibility of using reputation as a form of intangible collateral. In such circumstances, firms had incentives to group together for purposes of mutual monitoring and insurance.