Local granaries and central government disaster relief: Moral hazard and intergovernmental finance in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0507
DOI：
10.1017/S002205070400261X
发表日期：
2004
页码：
100-124
关键词：
摘要：
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Chinese state attempted to administer famine relief partly through a nationwide institution of local granaries. This article explores regional variations in the performance of this institution to understand the reasons for its ultimate breakdown. The evidence suggests granary storage levels were systematically lower in provinces that received more frequent central government disaster relief, and an unintended consequence of disaster relief was that it modified local incentives for self-insurance and led to an incompletely resolved moral-hazard problem. China's experience provides an instructive example of the long-term dynamics present in intergovernmental policies.