Bank supervision, regulation, and instability during the Great Depression

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Santa Clara University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050705050060
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 152-185
• 关键词: deposit insurance; risk-taking; requirements; STABILITY; failures; capture

摘要

Even after controlling for local economic conditions, differences in supervision and regulation help explain the large variation in state bank suspension rates across U.S. counties during the Great Depression. More stringent capital requirements lowered suspension rates whereas laws prohibiting branch banking and imposing high reserve requirements raised them. States whose bank supervisors could liquidate banks minimized contagion and credit-channel dislocations and experienced lower suspension rates. Those that gave their supervisors sole authority to issue bank charters and granted their supervisors long terms strengthened the incentives for bank lobbyists to influence supervisory decisions and consequently experienced higher rates of suspension.