An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Glazer, J; Rubinstein, A
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0074
发表日期：
1996
页码：
32-42
关键词：
摘要：
We show that fur solvable games, the calculation of the strategies which survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies ill normal games is equivalent to the calculation of the backward induction outcome of some extensive game. However, whereas the normal Same form does nor provide information an how to cam out the elimination, the corresponding extensive game dots. As a by-product, we conclude that implementation using a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive Same with perfect information is equivalent to implementation through a solution concept which we call guided iteratively elimination of dominated strategies which requires a uniform order of elimination. Journal nai of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.
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