The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: George Mason University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050724000093
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: -
• 关键词: NONHOMOTHETIC PREFERENCES; Conspicuous consumption; income-distribution; real wages; medieval; plague; divergence; demand; INEQUALITY; epidemics

摘要

Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that captures the notion that consumption by ordinary citizens poses a status threat to ruling elites. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income-sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states with less extractive institutions, whose ruling elites face a greater status threat from the rising commercial class. We test these predictions using a new dataset of country and city-level sumptuary laws.It is unfortunately an established fact that both men and womenfolk have, in utterly irresponsible manner, driven extravagance in dress and new styles to such shameful and wanton extremes that the different classes are barely to be known apart. -Nuremberg Ordnance of 1657, Quoted in Hunt (1996)