Sovereign Collateral

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: University of Pennsylvania; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); European Central Bank; Bank of Italy
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050724000020
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 191-231
• 关键词: london stock-exchange; 19th-century; debt; MARKETS; LESSONS; credit; STATES; LAWS

摘要

Due to a dearth of data, nineteenth century lending to sovereign borrowers was a blind date. We argue this is the reason for collateral pledges found in contemporary lending covenants, which enabled not execution, but the production of reliable fiscal data. Lawyers injected collateral clauses in sovereign debt covenants to permit credible disclosure of hard-to-access tax data. The study foregrounds the importance of big law firms as financial intermediaries and information producers. It also contributes a new view on the role played by contracts in sovereign debt. No [underwriting] firm can take precautions against the repudiation of a [sovereign] hypothecation. -Thomas Baring, 1865