The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation: The Case of Coffee, 1930-1940

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Stanford University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050725100831
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: -
• 关键词: Collusion; STABILITY

摘要

We inquire how a commodity cartel is created by studying the negotiations between Colombia and Brazil to stabilize the international coffee market in the 1930s. We show how differences among actors involved in the industry within the negotiating countries in terms of land ownership and type of coffee produced, prevented early cartelization agreements. Cartelization was only achieved when four factors converged: financial and infrastructural capability to store excess production, in-depth knowledge of the industry by the negotiating parties, full government support, and presence of a third-party enforcer. We combine an innovative game-theoretic approach with previously unexplored archival sources.