A model of political parties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levy, G
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00254-0
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 250-277
• 关键词: Political parties; coalition formation; multidimensional policy space

摘要

This paper presents a new model of political parties. I assume that the role of parties is to increase the commitment ability of politicians vis-a-vis the voters. Whereas a politician running alone can only offer his ideal policy, the set of policies that a party can commit to is the Pareto set of its members. I show that the commitment mechanisms provided by the institution of parties has no effect when the policy space is unidimensional; the policies parties can induce in equilibrium arise also when politicians are running independently. However, when the policy space is multidimensional, politicians use the vehicle of parties to offer equilibrium policies that they cannot offer in their absence. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.