OPTIMAL TARIFFS ON EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
KARP, L; NEWBERY, DM
署名单位：
University of Southampton; University of Cambridge
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(91)90023-Y
发表日期：
1991
页码：
285-299
关键词：
摘要：
We characterize the Markov perfect equilibria of two games in which oligopsonistic importers of an exhaustible resource confront competitive suppliers who have rational expectations. The games differ only in the timing of moves, or the speed with which participants can adjust their plans. The optimal tariff when sellers move first (are less flexible) differs considerably from that in which buyers move first, and sellers retain more control over intertemporal arbitrage opportunities. If the initial stock is small, buyers suffer a disadvantage from being the first-mover, this is reversed if the stock is large.
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