LOBBYING VS ADMINISTERED PROTECTION - ENDOGENOUS INDUSTRY CHOICE AND NATIONAL WELFARE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MOORE, MO; SURANOVIC, SM
署名单位：
George Washington University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(92)90021-B
发表日期：
1992
页码：
289-303
关键词：
摘要：
Import-competing industries in many democracies can pursue import relief via administered protection (AP) procedures or can lobby politicians directly. In this paper an industry chooses the option that maximizes expected profits. Both the AP and lobbying processes require a fixed resource cost and have an associated subjective probability of success. We show that policy reforms that decrease the probability of success under administered protection or lobbying may reduce expected national welfare when both processes are potentially profitable.