DEBT WRITE-DOWNS AND DEBT EQUITY SWAPS IN A 2-SECTOR MODEL
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
GOLDBERG, L; SPIEGEL, MM
署名单位：
New York University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(92)90004-4
发表日期：
1992
页码：
267-283
关键词：
摘要：
'Debt overhang' models have motivated the possibility of Pareto-improving market-based debt-reduction schemes through the assumption that creditors can seize debtor output under default. These models usually reach the conclusion that both debtor-financed debt repurchases and debt-equity swaps are not in the interest of debtor nations. This paper re-examines these conclusions for a debtor nation that also has a 'safe sector' which is unexposed to seizure. Debt overhangs are then shown to distort the composition of investment in the debtor nation. Nominal debt reductions mitigate these distortions, enhancing the potential for Pareto-improving debt-equity swaps.