WHY ARE SO MANY ANTIDUMPING PETITIONS WITHDRAWN
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
PRUSA, TJ
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(92)90047-N
发表日期：
1992
页码：
1-20
关键词：
摘要：
The number of antidumping petitions initiated has increased dramatically in recent years. However, only one-third of antidumping cases actually result in dumping duties being levied. Surprisingly, nearly as many antidumping cases are withdrawn or are voluntarily terminated. We present data that show that these withdrawn cases have at least as great an effect on trade as cases which resulted in duties. We discuss legal reasons why such settlements are possible and present a model of the bargaining process. We find that petitions with low probability of success ('nuisance' suits) actually confer large gains to both domestic and foreign firms.