IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND PARETO-IMPROVING STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ANIS, AH; ROSS, TW
署名单位：
University of British Columbia; University of Ottawa; Ottawa Hospital Research Institute
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(92)90009-9
发表日期：
1992
页码：
363-371
关键词：
摘要：
This paper addresses the concern that strategic trade policy will inevitably invite retaliation by presenting examples in which tariffs and export taxes/subsidies can improve the welfare of importing and exporting nations at the same time. We argue that retaliation is less likely in such cases. The conditions required for these results depend upon the relative sizes of the markets in the trading countries, the number of firms in each, and the shape of market demand and cost functions.