A MODEL OF EXPROPRIATION WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
RAFF, H
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(92)90003-3
发表日期：
1992
页码：
245-265
关键词：
摘要：
Incomplete information about a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) technology may induce a host country to expropriate the MNE's subsidiary even if other policy instruments are available. The threat of expropriation does not always deter foreign direct investment so that expropriation may actually occur with nonzero probability. Perfect sequential equilibria are derived for vertically and for horizontally integrated MNEs. The model provides predictions regarding the probability of expropriation based on observable MNE and host country characteristics. Countries would be better off if they could commit never to expropriate MNEs.
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