CONSTITUTIONAL RULES, REPUTATION, AND SOVEREIGN DEBT
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ROWLANDS, D
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(93)90023-Q
发表日期：
1993
页码：
335-350
关键词：
摘要：
The inability of governments to pre-commit to certain policies often results in Pareto-inefficient equilibria. A policy is not time-consistent if it requires a course of action that will subsequently become undesirable. This paper examines the possibility of creating constitutional rules which can support sovereign debt contracts which would otherwise violate the requirement of time-consistency. The possibility of establishing international reputation with internal enforcement mechanisms is sensitive to the constitutional environment, which will also determine the appropriate form of the constitutional rules.