STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY - CHOOSING BETWEEN EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND EXPORT QUOTAS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SHIVAKUMAR, R
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(93)90010-U
发表日期：
1993
页码：
169-183
关键词：
摘要：
I consider a trade policy game in which the choice of policy (subsidy or quota) and time of implementation [before (commit) or after (delay) observing the random demand intercept] is endogenously determined. Each country has four possible options: CQ, CS, DS and DQ, where CQ denotes a commitment to a quota and the other options are similarly labeled. For the special case of an international duopoly, countries prefer quotas to subsidies: CQ is chosen if noise is 'small' and DQ if noise is 'large'. Also interesting is that quotas in the DQ regime coincide with firms' desired exports.