LOBBYING AND COURNOT-NASH COMPETITION - IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MOORE, MO; SURANOVIC, SM
署名单位：
George Washington University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(93)90025-S
发表日期：
1993
页码：
367-376
关键词：
摘要：
Arguments for strategic trade intervention with Cournot duopolists are reconsidered in a model where domestic firms can lobby for increased subsidies. An export subsidy may not improve national welfare if lobbying costs are included. Even if an optimal positive subsidy exists, the government needs information about lobbying effectiveness in order to correctly implement the program.