MONETARY CONTRACTING BETWEEN CENTRAL BANKS AND THE DESIGN OF SUSTAINABLE EXCHANGE-RATE ZONES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
DELGADO, F; DUMAS, B
署名单位：
University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(93)90047-2
发表日期：
1993
页码：
201-224
关键词：
摘要：
An exchange-rate system is a contract which commits central banks to intervene in the foreign-exchange market. The design features of the system include: the rules of intervention, the limits placed on exchange rates and the 'crisis scenario' describing possible transitions to new regimes. This paper considers the various trade-offs one faces in designing an exchange-rate system. One of these pertains to the amount of reserves which the central banks must have on hand in order to forestall a speculative attack and make the system sustainable. The amount of reserves needed depends crucially on the assumed crisis scenario.