STRATEGIC NON-INTERVENTION AND THE CHOICE OF TRADE-POLICY FOR INTERNATIONAL OLIGOPOLY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
HWANG, HS; SCHULMAN, CT
署名单位：
University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1996
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(93)90067-8
发表日期：
1993
页码：
73-93
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes a game of strategic trade policy between governments who may choose among quantity controls. subsidies, and non-intervention as policy instruments. Central to the analysis is our view of non-intervention as a distinct policy choice. We derive conditions under which non-intervention is strictly preferred to the alternative instruments. Preferences between non-intervention and the Nash equilibrium subsidy confirm to a simple distance measure involving the Stackelberg leadership subsidy; the subsidy level (zero or Nash) that is closest to the Stackelberg subsidy being preferred.
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