THE ALLOCATION OF SEIGNIORAGE IN A COMMON CURRENCY AREA

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: SIBERT, A
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(94)90028-0
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 111-122
• 关键词: COMMON CURRENCY AREA; monetary union; Seigniorage

摘要

This paper considers the allocation of seigniorage in a common currency area with an independent central bank. It is shown that if the central bank retains autonomy in the allocation of seigniorage, inflation will be suboptimally high and taxes and government spending will be suboptimally low. Constitutionally mandating the rate of money growth will result in optimal inflation, but taxes and government spending will be too low. As long as consumers do not put too much weight on public good consumption, relative to private, it is better to constitutionally mandate seigniorage allocation shares than the level of money growth.