Rationalizable implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: Princeton University; Yale University; Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.011
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1253-1274
• 关键词: Implementation; Complete information; rationalizability; Maskin monotonicity; robust mechanism design; robust implementation

摘要

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive, i.e. in distinct states it selects distinct outcomes, we show that strict Maskin monotonicity is also sufficient under a mild no worst alternative condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We discuss how our results extend when the social choice function is not responsive. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.