Mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellingsen, T; Stole, LA
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(95)01401-2
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 67-84
• 关键词: mandated countertrade; Trade policy; asymmetric information

摘要

Mandated countertrade is a policy to restrict unilateral imports. A country's government thereby in effect commits domestic firms not to purchase from a foreign trading partner unless there are reciprocal sales. We argue that the policy may be a rational response to fundamental contracting failures, our key assumption being that sellers are incompletely informed about buyers' valuations. In line with observed practices, the analysis suggests that an optimal mandated countertrade policy will target high mark-up imports and low mark-up exports. Implications for global welfare are ambiguous and depend upon the extent of a double coincidence of wants.