Sleeping quotas, pre-emptive quota bidding and monopoly power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cunha, LCE; Santos, V
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(95)01381-4
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 127-148
• 关键词: quota equivalence; endogenous-valuations auctions; pre-emption

摘要

We rationalize the puzzling existence of binding quotas that are not fully utilized. Our model has its roots in Bhagwati (1965, in: R. Baldwin et al., eds., Trade, growth and the balance of payments: Essays in honor of G. Haberler (MIT Press, New York)) on tariffs/quotas equivalence and is related to the IO literature on pre-emption. We study the conditions that lead a monopolist, facing a quota-restricted market, to buy the quota licenses itself and the conditions under which they may remain unused. The divisibility of the quota is crucial for the monopolist to pre-emptively buy the quota. Furthermore, we study the implications of ''use-it-or-lose-it'' clauses commonly imposed on auctioned quotas.