Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kets, Willemien
• 署名单位: The Santa Fe Institute; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.003
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 300-325
• 关键词: Incomplete information; higher-order beliefs; Robustness; Strategic proximity; Local interactions; Anonymous games; Heterogeneous externalities; Network games

摘要

This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris (1998) [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.