Voluntary export restraints and strategic technology transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Song, EY
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(95)01387-3
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 165-186
• 关键词: voluntary export restraints; Licensing; cournot; entry; TECHNOLOGY

摘要

This paper investigates the effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in the presence of potential entrants and technology transfers. It builds a model of a licensing game in a Cournot oligopoly market, and examines conditions under which VERs induce restrained foreign firms to transfer technologies to potential suppliers. I show that a VER can decrease the profit and output of the domestic incumbent by perturbing the no-licensing equilibrium reached under free trade and inducing the market to move to a licensing equilibrium.