Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newton, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 364-381
• 关键词: Bargaining; learning; core; convexity; coalitions

摘要

An evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors. The stochastic stability properties of the model are then examined and it is shown that stochastically stable states solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem which reduces to maximizing a Rawlsian SWF for a common class of utility functions. In contrast to previous analyses, the stochastically stable state is unique for a broad class of utility functions. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.