Country-bashing tariffs: Do bilateral trade deficits matter?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cox, WM; Ruffin, RJ
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Dallas; University of Houston System; University of Houston
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(97)00041-X
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 61-72
• 关键词: country-bashing tariffs

摘要

This paper investigates the impact of restricting bilateral trade imbalances in a three country, three good model. Bilateral trade balances matter because, in the Nash equilibrium, each country will impose tariffs on countries with whom they have bilateral deficits or promote trade with countries with whom they have bilateral surpluses. All countries lose from a Nash country-bashing war. Each country loses from the unilateral elimination of its bilateral imbalances, But a country can gain from a bilateral agreement with its deficit partner provided that country has a surplus with a country devoted to free trade. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.