Mixed strategy equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate: A comment

• 成果类型: Editorial Material
• 署名作者: Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.008
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 393-396
• 关键词: spatial competition; Mixed strategies; Candidate quality

摘要

This note complements Aragones and Palfrey (2002) [2] by providing upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium payoff of the advantaged (disadvantaged) candidate for any symmetric distribution of the median voter's ideal policy and any (even or odd) number of equidistant locations. These bounds point to a negative (positive) relationship between the equilibrium payoff of the (dis)advantaged candidate and the uncertainty regarding the median voter's preferences. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.