Multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Freund, C
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(99)00051-3
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 359-376
• 关键词: trade; Regionalism; imperfect competition

摘要

This paper examines the interaction between preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and multilateral tariff reduction in a model of imperfect competition. A growing literature finds that the formation of PTAs alters the incentives for and the sustainability of multilateral tariff reduction. We show that the causation is not one-sided: multilateral tariff reduction also affects the formation of PTAs. Specifically, tariff reduction enhances the incentives to form a PTA and increases the likelihood that it is self-enforcing. Thus, each round of multilateral tariff reduction should lead to a new wave of PTAs. This may help to explain the current trend towards regionalism. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.