Time consistent export quotas in an oligopolistic world market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gervais, JP; Lapan, HE
• 署名单位: Iowa State University; Laval University; Laval University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00125-8
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 445-463
• 关键词: Time consistency; export quotas; precommitment; forward contracts

摘要

We investigate the strategic behavior between exporting countries that face endogenous terms of trade on the world market. In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal export quota is not time consistent as the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign import demand curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we show that the exporters' inability to irrevocably commit to their quota may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. If exporters can sell forward a proportion of their exports before production decisions are made, they will do so even though, in equilibrium, it may decrease welfare compared to a situation in which forward markets do not exist. Moreover, the equilibrium with forward markets is welfare inferior to the commitment equilibrium for exporters. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.